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The concept of peacekeeping' entails a fundamental contradiction,
since its success depends upon the deployment of soldiers to deter armed
conflict.2 Some notable peacekeeping efforts since World War II have
sought to overcome this contradiction by stressing their impartial char-
acter, and by adopting procedures designed to guarantee the neutral be-
havior of their forces.3 Most such peacekeeping missions have been
established and conducted under UN auspices,4 on the assumption that
an international body could best approximate the neutral, detached per-
spective ideally suited to successful peacekeeping. Indeed, UN-spon-
sored missions have reinforced this assumption by adopting a legal and
technical framework which enhanced their reputation as neutral inter-
venors. While the appearance of neutrality has not always averted con-
troversy in peacekeeping efforts,5 it has generally increased their chances
t J.D. Candidate, Harvard University; M.A.L.D. Candidate, Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy.
1. The concept of peacekeeping was developed by Lester Pearson, then-UN Secretary-
General Dag Hammarskjold, and General E.L.M. Burns for application in the Suez crisis of
1956. See 1 S. BAILEY, How WARS END: THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE TERMINATION
OF ARMED CONFLICT, 1946-1964 at 268-71 (1982). It evolved from the earlier notion of
"peace observation," i.e., the sending of neutral observers to monitor truces and cease-fires, as
first used by the UN in Indonesia, Kashmir, and Palestine. See generally D. WAINHOUSE,
INTERNATIONAL PEACE OBSERVATION: A HISTORY AND FORECAST (1966). This Article
will consider only peacekeeping which involves the stationing of military forces - armed or
unarmed - as a neutral barrier between hostile parties.
2. The basic premise of a peacekeeping operation is that combatants will not shoot at a
neutral force that has no stake in the conflict. The difficulty with this premise is that the
peacekeeping force necessarily influences the outcome of the conflict, if only by ending combat.
See D. FORSYTHE, UNITED NATIONS PEACEMAKING 4-10 (1972), for an explanation of the
influences under which UN peace efforts operate.
3. See S. BAILEY, supra note 1, at 369-70.
4. The main missions have included UNEF in the Middle East, I R. HIGGINS, UNITED
NATIONS PEACEKEEPING, 1946-1967 at 221-43 (1969); the ONUC in the Congo, 3 R. HIG-
GINS, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING, 1946-1967 (1980); the Unified Command in Korea,
2 R. HIGGINS, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING, 1946-1967 at 153-59, 160-73 (1970); UN-
FICYP in Cyprus, D. WAINHOUSE, INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING AT THE CROSSROADS
345-94 (1973). The UN has conducted numerous other small-scale military and observer
missions.
5. The history of the UN effort in the Congo provides an example of a peacekeeping effort
hampered not only by opposition and conflict over its activities after deployment, but also by
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of success. 6
In recent years some parties have turned to independent peacekeeping,
intervening in civil or international conflicts without UN support or au-
thorization. The intervening states have generally claimed to be acting
under the authority of the UN Charter (the Charter) or other sources of
international law.7 Unfortunately, peacekeeping missions organized
outside the UN are particularly subject to the accusations of partiality
that can undermine a peacekeeping effort. The tragic experiences of the
Multinational Force in Lebanon (MNF) during the years 1982-84 illus-
trate the pitfalls which non-UN peacekeepers may face. Beginning with-
out the benefit of assumed neutrality which UN forces are supposed to
enjoy, the MNF organized and conducted itself in a manner which only
strong disagreements about its legality and the strength of its mandate from the UN itself. On
local conflict, see 3 R. HIGGINS, supra note 4, ch. 10-11. On the struggle over the legality and
financing of ONUC, see 3 R. HIGGINS, ch. 11, and Certain Expenses of the United Nations,
1962 I.C.J. 49 (Advisory Opinion).
The simple act of ending an armed conflict may itself be viewed as non-neutral. Moreover,
once deployed at the area of conflict, a peacekeeping force may be drawn into the fighting. Its
mere presence may antagonize existing groups not adequately prepared to cooperate. See A.
GROOM, PEACEKEEPING 6, 21-22, 27-28 (Lehigh University Research Monograph No. 4,
1973).
6. See generally L. FABIAN, SOLDIERS WyIOUT ENEMIES 23-28 (1971).
7. In 1976, a 30,000-member Arab Deterrent Force, organized by the Arab League and
composed primarily of Syrian troops, entered Lebanon. Its stated mission was to oversee the
withdrawal of Palestinian forces to the south of Lebanon. W. KHALIDI, CONFLICT AND VIO-
LENCE IN LEBANON: CONFRONTATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST 57-68 (1979). The Arab
League presumably argued that it acted under Article 52 of the Charter, which allows regional
organizations to preserve or restore "international peace and security" in all "appropriate"
situations. See, e.g., H. KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 324-28 (1950).
In 1981, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) sent a peacekeeping force to Chad to
mediate the conflict between Chadian factions. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1981, at 7, col. 1.
For details on opposition to the OAU force, its attempt to receive UN financing, and its even-
tual withdrawal, see N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1982 at A16, col. 1; N.Y. Times, April 1, 1982 at
A13, col. I; N.Y. Times, June 12, 1982 at 2, col. 3. As a recognized regional organization, the
OAU could also claim authority under Charter Article 52 for its action. See H. KELSEN,
supra.
Other non-UN actions which might be characterized as either observation or peacekeeping
missions include the force that supervised the Chinese evacuation from Burmese territory in
1953, see D. WAINHOUSE, supra note 1, at 485-89; the commissions established to monitor the
Vietnamese settlements of 1954 and 1973, I. RnIHYE, M. HARBOTrLE & B. EGGE, THE THIN
BLUE LINE: INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING AND ITS FUTURE at ch. 10 (1974); the British
police presence in Cyprus prior to introduction of UN peacekeepers, see J. BOYD, UNITED
NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS: A MILITARY AND POLITICAL APPRAISAL 44-47
(197 1); and the contingents that participated in independent Middle East peacekeeping efforts.
The latter include the non-UN forces that monitored strategic passes as part of the 1975 Sinai
II peace treaty, see Napoliello, The Sinai Field Mission: A Step Towards Peace in the Middle
East, PARAMETERS: J. US ARMY WAR COLLEGE, Dec. 1979, at 20, and the Sinai field mission
that joined Israeli and Egyptian forces in policing the Camp David agreements after the
United Nations Emergency Force's mandate expired, see Nelson, Peacekeeping Aspects of the
Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty and Consequences for United Nations Peacekeeping, 10 DEN. J.
INT'L L. AND POL'Y 113, 121-39 (1980); see also T. FRANCK, NATION AGAINST NATION 180
(1985).
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magnified doubts about the impartiality of its mission. 8 Its presence in
Lebanon may, in the end, only have aggravated the conflict which it was
designed to ameliorate.
This Article will suggest that future non-UN peacekeeping efforts
would benefit from the adoption of practices and rules developed by past
UN missions. In particular, such efforts should be clearly sanctioned by
international law and should be conducted in ways which discourage
challenges to their impartiality. Situations in which the legal and techni-
cal legitimacy of a neutral peacekeeping force cannot be established may
be better suited to treatment by other methods of conflict resolution than
through deployment of a peacekeeping force.
Part I of this Article will examine the legal status of UN and non-UN
peacekeepers in international law, with emphasis on the constraints and
requirements faced by each type of force. It will also review the technical
procedures followed by past UN forces. Part II will describe the estab-
lishment and performance of the MNF in Lebanon, suggesting that a
lack of attention to legal and military technicalities may have encouraged
opposition to the force, and may consequently have reduced its effective-
ness. Part III will propose some legal and technical norms which future
non-UN peacekeeping missions would find it advantageous to observe.
I. Peacekeeping in International Law and Practice
The UN's powers to establish and deploy a peacekeeping force in inter-
national crises are carefully circumscribed by the rules of the UN Char-
ter9 and the practices developed by past missions. 10 While such legal and
technical norms may reduce the flexibility of UN efforts, they serve to
enhance the international credibility of UN-sponsored missions. As will
be shown below, the lack of such formal constraints and procedures in
the case of non-UN peacekeeping missions may seem to give them
greater freedom of action, but in reality undermines the international
base of support essential to their success.
8. Critics of the MNF suggest that it became too closely identified with the Gemayel gov-
ernment, and with Western interests, to be treated as a neutral force by the parties to the
Lebanese conflict. They also criticize the MNFs use of force to retaliate against armed at-
tacks. Lewis, Deeper and Deeper, N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1983, at A31, col. 1; Scheffer, Beirut
Needs a UN Force, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1983, at A35, col. 4; see generally Weinberger,
Peacekeeping Options in Lebanon, 37 MIDDLE EAsT J. 363-67 (Summer 1983).
9. See J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 112-113 (6th ed. 1963).
10. A set of basic guidelines derived from past UN missions is contained in INTERNA-
TIONAL PEACE ACADEMY, PEACEKEEPER'S HANDBOOK (1978).
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A. Establishment of Peacekeeping Forces
Peacekeeping missions established under UN auspices may be initiated
by either the Security Council (the Council) or the General Assembly
(the Assembly). The Council bears "primary responsibility for the main-
tenance of international peace and security,""1 and that responsibility in
itself may empower the Council both to solicit volunteers for peacekeep-
ing operations and to assign the Secretary-General to carry out such op-
erations. 12 The Council's responsibility endures, it has been suggested,
until it has taken enforcement measures under Article 42 of the Charter,
at which time the duty to observe such measures passes to member
states. 13 Further, the General Assembly may exercise its own peacekeep-
ing powers when a veto blocks Security Council action. These powers, set
out in the "Uniting for Peace" resolution sponsored by the United States
in 1950,14 are now regarded as springing directly from the Charter it-
self.15 Of course, member states are not obligated to contribute forces to
peacekeeping missions unless the Council orders Chapter VII "enforce-
ment" measures, 16 and then only pursuant to appropriate agreements. In
the absence of such orders, member states may bear, at best, a moral
responsibility to provide forces requested by the General Assembly.
While these states are thus under no compulsion to commit forces to
peacekeeping missions,17 the history of UN peacekeeping shows no lack
of willingness to commit such forces voluntarily. The commitment of
peacekeeping troops has been perceived by some smaller states as a
means to win international standing and prestige, among other goals. 18
Assuming that member states accept the legitimacy of these UN
peacekeeping powers without protest, such powers may only be exercised
after consideration and passage of peacekeeping proposals by the Council
or the Assembly. Sponsors must seek broad support for their proposals,
ensuring that peacekeeping missions will reflect the common interests
11. U.N. CHARTER art. 24.
12. J. BRIERLY, supra note 9, at 380-93.
13. H. KELSEN, supra note 7, at 272-73.
14. See GAOR, Annexes (V), at 2, U.N. Doe. A/1377, Sept. 20, 1950; and L. SOHN,
CASES ON UNITED NATIONS LAW 491-92. See generally Reicher, The Uniting for Peace Reso-
lution on the 30th Anniversary of its Passage, 20 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1981).
15. In the Certain Expenses case, supra note 5, the International Court of Justice suggested
that Articles 14 and 22, among others, may provide sufficient authority. See Reicher, supra
note 14, at 40, and Sohn, infra note 17, at 770-73.
16. U.N. CHARTER arts. 43 and 45.
'17. Sohn, The Authority of the United Nations to Establish and Maintain a Permanent
United Nations Force, 52 AM. J. INT'L L. 229, 231-33 (1958); see Gross, Voting in the Security
Council: Abstention in the Post-1965 Amendment Phase and Its Impact on Article 25 of the
Charter, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 315, 330-31 (1968).
18. See generally D. WAINHOUSE, supra note 4, ch. 15 and 16.
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and objectives of the international community. Thus, peacekeeping mis-
sions authorized by the UN are likely to have substantial international
backing.
The UN framework for authorizing peacekeeping presents some disad-
vantages. First, Security Council vetos and General Assembly divisions
and abstentions may paralyze efforts to form peacekeeping forces. Sec-
ond, the lengthy process of achieving consensus may delay authorization
for a peacekeeping force until after a crisis situation has reached the
breaking point. The failure of the UN to respond adequately to the Leba-
nese crisis of Fall 1982, and to Middle Eastern events generally, provides
a clear example of these difficulties. 19 Finally, some observers have ar-
gued that the current domination of the UN by certain international
groups-most notably those of the Third World bloc-may have begun
to undermine the UN's reputation for impartial action in crises, or at
least to reduce its effectiveness in international consensus-building. 20
. In sharp contrast to UN-sponsored missions, independent peacekeep-
ing operations may be established at the will of individual states, subject
only to the requirements of their internal constitutional and foreign pol-
icy mechanisms. Many states that have made verbal commitments to
work through UN forums in their international relations have later cho-
sen to intervene unilaterally in situations they wanted to influence. 21
Member states which pursue efforts to quell a dispute or bring about
peace are under no duty to employ the framework of the UN for such
efforts.22 Peacekeeping efforts are legal so long as they respect the dic-
tates of general international law.
The freedom of individual states to undertake peacekeeping missions
offers an alternative, with its own advantages and disadvantages, to UN
peacekeeping. Since they need not consult with other states to form a
19. See generally UN Secretary General Struggles to Stay Useful, N.Y. Times, Oct. 25,
1983, at A18, col. 1; and At the UN, No Activity on Lebanon, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1983, at
A17, col. 4. See also infra notes 82-118 and accompanying text.
20. See, eg., Gross, On the Degradation of the Constitutional Environment of the United
Nations, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 569 (1983); Finger, The Reagan-Kirkpatrick Policies and the
United Nations, 62 FOREIGN AFF. 436 (Winter 1983-84); see also Kalb, UN Abdication, The
New Republic, Apr. 28, 1982, at 13-14; Don't Count on UN, U.S. News and World Rep., Dec.
27, 1982.
21. See, eg., POWER AND LAW 89-91 (C. Barker ed. 1971) (U.S. policy).
22. L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO & A. SIMONS, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 54-55
(1969). The UN Charter requires disputants to apply "peaceful means of their own choice" for
settlement, Art. 33, and to refer continuing disputes "likely to endanger international peace
and security" to the Security Council or General Assembly, Arts. 33, 35, and 37(1). There are
no such constraints on member states who are not parties to a dispute. It is the UN as an
organization, rather than its individual members, which bears the duty to maintain and restore
international peace and security where Art. 33 disputes are concerned. See H. KELSEN, supra
note 7, at 971.
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peacekeeping force, participating states may swiftly and decisively estab-
lish their own mandate, peacekeeping goals, and operating procedures.
However, failure to consult other states may result in the establishment
of a mission to which there is substantial international opposition.2 3 Fur-
thermore, while there is some value in defining the peacekeeping man-
date in flexible terms,24 the lack of clarity which results may lead to
controversy over the duties and purposes of the force.2 5 There is also a
greater likelihood that the commitment of participants in the non-UN
peacekeeping mission will be affected by domestic political
considerations.
B. Deployment of Peacekeeping Forces
It is a principle well established in international law that the armed
forces of individual states may not enter or act within the territory of a
particular state without the latter's presumed or actual consent.26 The
legal deployment of peacekeeping forces then requires either the consent
of the host country or some exception to this requirement. It is often far
from clear whether "consent" has actually been given, whether such con-
sent covers all of the activities of the force in question, or whether the
government purporting to grant consent possesses the legal authority to
do So.2 7 In the absence of authoritative consent, it may be difficult to
distinguish a "peacekeeping" mission from military intervention.28
While UN missions operate under rules designed to avoid such contro-
versies, non-UN missions may find themselves on uncertain legal ground.
There are some exceptions to the requirement of consent of the host
government. The UN Charter provides exceptions to the general prohi-
bition under Article 2(4) of the threat or use of armed force against or
23. See D. FORSYTHE, supra note 2, at 10-11.
24. See S. BAILEY, supra note 1, at 369, and D. WAINHOUSE, supra note 4, at 555.
25. Weinberger, supra note 8, at 364.-
26. See Case Concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v. India), 1960
I.C.J. 6, at 63 (separate opinion of Judge Koo).
27. Legal authority is predicated upon effective control. See Tinoco Case (Great Britain v.
Costa Rica), 1 R.I.A.A. 369 (1923) ("The issue is not whether the new government assumes
power or conducts its administration under constitutional limitations established by the people
during the incumbency of the government it has overthrown. The question is, has it really
established itself in such a way that all within its influence recognize its control...").
The United States has granted de facto recognition to governments which control the ad-
ministrative machinery of the state, have won the general acquiescence of its people, and are
willing to discharge the state's international obligations. W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 340 (3d ed. 1971). On general practices regarding recognition of a
particular government's authority in a state, see generally J. BRIERLY, supra note 9, at 144-61.
28. R. LITTLE, INTERVENTION: EXTERNAL INVOLVEMENT IN CIVIL WARS 24-25 (1975).
See Duner, The Many-Pronged Spear: External Military Intervention in Civil Wars in the
1970s, 20 J. PEACE RESEARCH 59 (1983).
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within other states.29 These include a right of "individual or collective
self-defense" against armed attack,30 which presumably authorizes third
states to intervene in a collective effort on behalf of an ally under attack.
The exceptions also include the right of the Security Council, or of re-
gional security organizations acting under its authorization, to undertake
collective action when international peace and security are endangered. 31
Some theorists have suggested that since the deployment of UN
peacekeeping or security forces does not constitute a use of "armed
force" within the meaning of Article 2(4), such deployment may be legal
without host state authorization, even when the requirements of Chapter
VII have not been met.32 However, past UN peacekeeping practice has
wisely avoided controversies over UN powers to deploy peacekeeping
troops unilaterally. In most cases, UN peacekeepers have only been
deployed with the consent of all parties to a dispute, ensuring a sound
legal basis for the presence of UN forces.33
Indeed, it is the essence of UN peacekeeping that it occurs only with
the consent of all combatants, as a "buffer" between them or an "instru-
ment of persuasion,"'34 giving the parties the opportunity to reach an
agreement. Most authorities agree that peacekeepers should not be
brought in to enforce municipal law and order when a domestic party
which claims "government" status has lost control,35 or when a govern-
ment's continued authority is threatened by a successful rebel move-
ment.36 Of course, even if such internal struggles are not appropriate
circumstances for peacekeeping missions, they may permit or even re-
quire a UN or other international response, diplomatic or military. 37 But
a rule permitting the deployment of peacekeepers without the consent of
29. See Rowles, The United States, The OAS, and the Dilemma of the Undesirable Regime,
13 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 385, 388-89 (Supp. 1983).
30. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
31. Id., arts. 39-42, 53.
32. See Evensen, Problems of International Law Relating to the Establishment of UN Se-
curity Forces, in PEACE-KEEPING EXPERIENCE AND EVALUATION: THE OSLO PAPERS 235
(P. Frydenberg ed. 1964).
33. See D. WAINHOUSE, supra note 4, at 556; Sohn, supra note 17, at 239 (host-state con-
sent is required for deployment of UN forces, although it might be implied from near-unani-
mous General Assembly authorization under the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution). See also
Garvey, United Nations Peacekeeping and Host State Consent, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 241 (1970).
34. See Parsons, The United Nations and International Security in the 1980s, 12 MIL-
LENIUM 101, 106 (Summer 1983).
35. See Miller, Legal Aspects of the United Nations Action in the Congo, 55 AM. J. INT'L L.
1, 23 (1961). ("[lIt is virtually an axiom of the UN that internal political or factional disputes
are outside the purview of the Organization," although the Congo action was an exception to
this rule.)
36. See D. BowETr, UNITED NATIONS FORCES: A LEGAL STUDY 272-73 (1964); A.
ZEIDAN, THE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE 1956-1967, at 150-51 (1976).
37. See, e.g., Szasz, Role of the United Nations in Internal Conflicts, 13 GA. J. INT'L &
Vol. 10:222, 1984
Peacekeeping Without the UN
all parties might lead to the involvement of peacekeepers in domestic
issues, compromising their reputation for impartiality, and subjecting
them to attacks or other acts of opposition.38
The duty to obtain host state consent does not end the matter. In prac-
tice, states participating in a peacekeeping force may make their own
individual judgments about which party constitutes the government of a
given state39 and whether that government has granted consent for the
deployment of a peacekeeping force within its borders. Compliance with
the consent rules is thus ultimately subject to autointerpretation by par-
ticipating states.40 International law provides no clear means of deciding
which interpretation should prevail; thus, in reality autointerpretation
may result in a breakdown in international order.41
The history of both UN and non-UN peacekeeping efforts illustrates
the difficulties which arise when peacekeeping forces are deployed with-
out the consent of all parties to a dispute. The few UN peacekeeping or
security operations which did not obtain the consent of all parties before
deployment have been mired in controversy, reducing their effectiveness
considerably. During the Katanga uprising of 1960, disagreements be-
tween Patrice Lumumba and UN authorities over the purpose of the UN
mission - and disagreements over whether Moise Tshombe's consent
was required for the entry of UN forces into the secessionist province -
resulted in uncertainty and bloodshed.42 The essence of both disputes
was the degree to which Lumumba and Tshombe had granted or needed
to grant their consent for UN operations.43
During the Cyprus crisis of 1963, the Security Council delayed deploy-
ment of peacekeeping troops until it had concluded that the Greek Cyp-
riot "government" possessed authority to consent to UN intervention;
unfortunately, this decision did not stem controversy over the status of
the UN forces in Cyprus.44 Finally, to the extent that the Unified Com-
COMP. L. 345 (1983); Romphul, The Role of International and Regional Organizations in the
Peaceful Settlement of Internal Disputes, 13 GA. J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 371 (1983).
38. Even when consent is obtained, involvement in domestic issues remains a danger for all
peacekeeping missions. See Schachter, The United Nations and Internal Conflict, in DIPTrE
SETTLEMENT THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS 301, 337 (K. Raman ed. 1977).
39. Recognition is a matter of individual state policy, although granting or withdrawing it
under certain conditions may violate international law. See generally Kelsen, Recognition in
International Law, 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 605 (1941). On current state practice, see Peterson,
Recognition of Governments Should Not Be Abolished, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 31 (1983).
40. See generally Gross, States as Organs of International Law and the Problem of
Autointerpretation, LAW AND POLrICS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY 59 (G. Lipsky ed. 1953).
41. Id. at 75, 87.
42. See generally 3 R. HIGGINS, supra note 4, at 125-197; D. WAINHOuSE, supra note 4, at
269-74.
43. See, eg., 3 R. HIGGINS, supra note 4, at 132-33.
44. The fact that the rights of the Turkish-Cypriot Vice-President were not taken into
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mand effort in Korea can be considered a legitimate UN peacekeeping
action,45 it also posed controversial issues of consent, particularly since
neither of the disputants was represented in the UN forums which de-
cided to intervene.46
The insufficiency of the "host consent" standard as an acceptable legal
basis for intervention has been underscored by numerous controversies
over armed actions outside the realm of UN peacekeeping. On the West-
ern side, United States interventions in Lebanon (1958), the Dominican
Republic (1965), Vietnam (1965-73), and Grenada (1983) have received
extensive legal criticism. All involved to some degree the claim that host
state consent justified the presence of U.S. troops on foreign soil. 47 It
remains unclear, for example, whether the Chamoun government in Leb-
anon requested aid to invoke its right of collective self-defense against an
incursion by troops of the United Arab Republic, or whether it really
needed help in order to suppress an internal revolt which had gotten out
of hand.48 The U.S. claimed it had been invited into Lebanon by the
Chamoun government, but also invoked its right to protect U.S. nation-
als in that country as a separate legal justification.49 In the Dominican
crisis, President Johnson claimed that U.S. help had been requested in an
emerging struggle between the military government and Communist
rebels, although subsequent analysis casts doubt on the degree to which
the U.S.-backed junta that made the request actually controlled the coun-
try.50 In intervening in Vietnam, the U.S. claimed that South Vietnam
consideration in the determination probably contributed significantly to the controversy. See
Eiden, United Nations Forces in Domestic Conflicts, in P. Frydenberg, supra note 32, at 271
n.13.
45. The Soviet Union protested that its absence from the Security Council during key de-
liberations meant the Council decisions to send the Unified Command had no "legal force."
See Sohn, supra note 17, at 484. Some Western analysts contend that the Korean operation
lacked legitimacy in practice, if not in law, see, e.g., Nicholas, An Appraisal, in INTERNA-
TIONAL MILrrARY FORCES 105, 107 (L. Bloomfield ed. 1964), while others have charged that
it constituted a UN "cover for US action to repel North Korean aggression," A. COX, PROS-
PECTS OF PEACEKEEPING 7 (1967). See also Bruce, The United States and the Law of Man-
kind: Some Inconsistencies in the American Observance of the Rule of Law, in C. Barker, supra
note 21, at 96. For an overview of the legal issues presented by the Unified Command mission,
see Potter, Legal Aspects of the Situation in Korea, 44 AM. J. INT'L L. 709 (1950).
46. The Soviets also argued that the Korean conflict was a civil war, in which UN interfer-
ence was forbidden by UN Charter Article 2.7. See Sohn, supra note 17, at 482-84.
47. See infra notes 48-53, and accompanying text.
48. See Wright, United States Interention in the Lebanon, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 112 (1959).
49. Id See also D. Frolick, The Law and Practice of Collective Security in Contemporary
International Relations 111-12 (1971) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation at American
University).
50. See generally T. FRANCK & E. WEISBAND, WORLD POLITICS 76 (1971); T. HALPER,
FOREIGN POLICY CRISES 55-65 (1971). The Dominican military junta was on the verge of
collapse when an obscure military officer supposedly heading it requested the assistance of 200
Marines. Id. at 53-54.
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was a separate state which had exercised its sovereign rights to invite
U.S. forces into the country,51 but some critics of the U.S. intervention
have taken the position that North and South Vietnam were merely two
zones within a single state. According to the latter point of view, the
United States intervened illegally in a civil war by accepting the invita-
tion of the Saigon government, in violation of the Geneva accords of
1954 and of general international law.5 2 Observers of the U.S. interven-
tion in Grenada have questioned the legal validity of U.S. reliance on a
1981 Organization of Eastern Caribbean States treaty offered to show
Grenadan agreement to collective defense on its behalf.53
In the Eastern bloc, repeated Soviet interventions in neighboring coun-
tries have been rationalized by claims that the host country invited inter-
vention, although observers have questioned the validity of the
invitations. When, in 1956, Soviet-picked leader Janos Kadar invited So-
viet forces into Hungary after overthrowing Workers' Party Secretary
Imre Nagy, Soviet troops had apparently already been in Hungary for
five days.54 The Soviets reportedly tried but failed to find a group within
the Czech Central Committee willing to ask their help against counter-
revolution during the Prague Spring of 1968; they were forced to rely
upon alternative legal theories when they eventually intervened.5 5 Fi-
nally, the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan was justified by "pleas for help"
from Afghan Premier Babrak Karmal, although the pleas were broadcast
a day after Soviet troops had entered the country and placed him in
power.56 Given the Soviet role in Afghan politics, the independence of
the Afghan government would, in any case, have been subject to serious
doubt.5 7
It may readily be seen from these examples that host state consent has
51. R. HULL & J. NoVOGROD, LAW AND VIETNAM 86, 100 (1968). See also Moore, The
Lawfulness of Military Assistance to the Republic of Vietnam, 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 13 (1967).
52. These issues are discussed more fully in Hawkins, An Approach to Issues of Interna-
tional Law Raised by United States Actions in Vietnam, in 1 THE VIETNAM WAR AND INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 173-77 (R. Falk ed. 1968).
53. See, e.g., Rubin, Doing it Right in Grenada, Boston Herald, Nov. 2, 1983, at 31; Hud-
son, Professors Question Invasion's Legality, Morality, Advisability, 77 HARVARD LAW REC-
ORD 6-9 (No. 6, Nov. 4 1983). Critics argued that the intervention was improperly authorized
even under the terms of the Treaty since no "armed attack" on Grenada had taken place. See
generally The United States Action in Grenada, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 131 (1984).
54. The Soviets actually invervened twice, the first time after allegedly being invited by
Party Secretary Erno Gero. Throughout the uprising the Soviet Union vetoed Security Coun-
cil action on Hungary. See generally Rostow, Law and the Use of Force By States. The
Brezhnev Doctrine, 7 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORDER 209, at 222-27 (1981).
55. Id. at 229.
56. Id. at 236-37.
57. Id. For an overview of Soviet policy in the region, see Lenczowski, The Soviet Union
and the Persian Guf. An Encircling Strategy, 37 INT'L J. 307 (1982).
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often proved unpersuasive as a legal basis for intervention, whether by
the UN or by individual states or groups of states. Unless all disputants
agree to deployment of peacekeeping forces, the consent of the apparent
government may not provide a sufficient legal basis for the presence of
those forces. Thus, the UN has generally required the consent of all par-
ties before deployment, in the hope that this will minimize both interna-
tional and local opposition, and will bolster the legal and political
credibility of UN efforts. Unfortunately, however, the "all parties"
formula is not without its problems. Under this formula, the unwilling-
ness of even one party blocks deployment. Moreover, the possibility ex-
ists that the party obstructing the peacekeeping process will be a minor
or marginal participant in the dispute.
A more serious problem, not only with the "all parties" requirement
but with all consent formulae, is that whenever state consent is invoked
as the justification for peacekeeping activity in'a troubled area, the with-
drawal of that consent destroys the legal basis for the activity. Perhaps
the prime example was the request by President Nasser that the United
Nations Emergency Force leave Egyptian territory in 1967, which set the
stage for the Six-Day War.58 This incident weakened international confi-
dence in the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations,59 and some observ-
ers thought it imperative to make more binding the consent of host states
or other parties. Among the proposed solutions was the suggestion that
states be required to conduct a "good faith determination" of whether a
peacekeeping force had fulfilled its agreed-upon mission, and that they be
permitted to request the force's withdrawal only after finding that it had
not done so.6° Other suggestions would institute an "established proce-
dure of negotiation" under which state complaints could be reviewed
before revocation of consent becomes effective, 61 or would allow the UN
the ultimate power to decide when a force should withdraw. 62
Whether or not solutions to the problem of withdrawal of consent are
devised, UN practices are nonetheless more likely to create an "interna-
tional consensus" behind peacekeeping efforts than are the ad hoe proce-
dures of non-UN efforts. 63 This consensus may, in turn, be expected to
58. See generally Sohn, supra note 17, on the limits of the Secretary-General's authority to
agree to the withdrawal request, the need to consult the General Assembly, and similar issues.
59. See D. WAINHOUSE, supra note 4, at 556.
60. See Garvey, supra note 33, at 249.
61. Id. at 253.
62. See MeVitty, Wanted: Rules to Guide UN Peace-Keeping Operations of the Future, in 3
THE STRATEGY OF WORLD ORDER 574-78 (R. Falk & S. Mendlovitz eds. 1976).
63. See supra text accompanying notes 12-25.
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bring pressure upon disputants to accept UN peacekeeping forces, while
such pressure will be lacking where non-UN forces are concerned.
C. Norms of Peacekeeping Procedure
Although not required by general international law, some technical
rules for the performance of peacekeeping duties by soldiers, and for the
organization of peacekeeping forces by military and political leaders,
have become an established part of UN peacekeeping practice.64 To the
extent that these rules are accepted and approved by the international
community, their observance provides an additional source of support
for peacekeeping missions. The rules are designed generally to ensure
that peacekeeping forces operate impartially, consistently, and efficiently,
and that they avoid being drawn into the conflicts they are supposed to
ease. Three of the most important of these rules are reviewed here.
One requirement is that peacekeeping forces be comprised of units
from a limited number of states which are not involved, and are unlikely
to become involved, in the conflict at hand.65 Limiting the number of
national contingents increases the likelihood that the force will be a ho-
mogeneous unit and thus an effective one,66 while reducing bureaucratic
friction and delay.67 The choice of disinterested states is obviously re-
quired to maintain both actual impartiality and the appearance thereof.
The Secretary-General typically solicits and approves requests to partici-
pate with this consideration in mind, consulting as well with both the
parties to the disputes and the force commander. 68 With few excep-
tions,69 the superpowers and other permanent members of the Security
Council are excluded from UN peacekeeping forces on the ground that
their participation could polarize the conflict or cast doubt on the impar-
tial character of the mission. 70 Secretary-General Hammarskjold made
the non-participation of the permanent members of the Security Council
64. Usually, such rules are set by the Secretary-General and the mission commander,
rather than spelled out in the formal mandate of the mission. The basic statement of UN
peacekeeping practices is contained in "Summary Statement of the Experience Derived from
the Establishment and Operations of the Force," submitted by Secretary-General Dag Ham-
marskjold to the General Assembly in 1958. This statement describes the successful practices
of UNEF. U.N. Doc. A/3943, Oct. 9, 1958. See also S. BAILEY, supra note 1, at 363-77.
65. See 1 S. BAILEY, supra note 1, at 370-71.
66. D. WAINHOUSE, supra note 4, at 608.
67. See infra text accompanying notes 73-75 for discussion of force coordination.
68. S. BAILEY, supra note 1, at 371.
69. For example, British troops already in Cyprus remained there to participate in United
Nations Peacekeeping Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP) after 1964. See L. FABIAN, supra note 6
at 24. The Korean Unified Command included the United States and other major states,
although this has cast doubt on its "peacekeeping" character, as noted above. See supra note
45.
70. S. BAILEY, supra note 1, at 371. See also L. FABIAN, supra note 6 at 6.
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one of his primary recommendations for future operations, 71 and most
observers agree on the wisdom of his advice.72
A second rule is that, although the various troops technically remain
under the control of their national military commanders, coordination of
administrative and command functions must be centralized in a single
authority, the force commander. While this rule has long been pre-
scribed for UN missions, it has rarely been observed in practice.73 Some
missions have suffered from poor communication between national con-
tingents, from understaffing, or from poor administrative organization. 74
Moreover, a lack of standardized equipment and interchangeable sup-
plies has at times paralyzed support functions.75 These difficulties merely
underscore the desirability of centralized command and administration.
A third rule provides that UN peacekeepers may use force only in self-
defense. 76 The purpose of a peacekeeping force is largely symbolic, 77 and
its safety depends not on weapons but on the blue berets and UN insignia
which distinguish its members from ordinary troops. 78 It has been sug-
gested that a mission should have, at most, "the means to defend against
unlawful or poorly controlled armed elements. Such means should be
sufficient, under conditions short of all-out hostilities, to prevent person-
nel from being endangered or subject[ed] to humiliation by elements of
the armed forces of the host states or opposition factions. '79
However, it should not possess weapons needed to undertake other
"military functions. °80 Although there is some tension between the
71. See Hammarskjold, United Nations Emergency Force, in INTERNATIONAL MILITARY
FORCES, supra note 45 at 272.
72. In fact, there has long been a tacit agreement between the superpowers that neither
would commit its own forces to sensitive areas such as the Middle East, in peacekeeping opera-
tions or otherwise. See Ball, A Risky Mideast Course, N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1983, at A23, col.
3.
73. See D. WAiNHOUSE, supra note 4, at 613-14.
74. Id. The United Nations Truce Commission for Korea, though technically an observa-
tion mission, is cited as a prime example of the bureaucratic inefficiency inherent in interna-
tional peace efforts. See D. FORSYrHE, supra note 2, at 152.
75. D. WAINHOUSE, supra note 4, at 617-19. For example, during the Congo operation
UN forces used about 40 different types of vehicles. See L. Bloomfield, supra note 45, at 169.
76. See D. WAINHOUSE, supra note 4, at 566.
77. In the UN Emergency Force, the mandate of the peacekeeping force described the
force as "more than an observers' corps, but in no way a military force temporarily controlling
the territory in which it is stationed. . . ." quoted in I R. HIGGINS, supra note 4, at 242.
78. S. BAILEY, supra note 1, at 369. Cf Report of the Secretary-General in Pursuance of
Security Council Resolution 516 (1982) (discussing the protection afforded unarmed UN ob-
servers), 21 I.L.M. 1172 (1982).
79. D. WAINHOUSE, supra note 4, at 617.
80. UNEFs mandate excluded military functions "exceeding those necessary to secure
peaceful conditions on the assumption that the parties to the conflict take all necessary steps
for compliance with the recommendation of the General Assembly" (i.e. to implement the
cease-fire and secure order). 1 R. HIGGINS, supra note 4, at 242.
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peacekeepers' need to defend themselves and their need to be readily dis-
tinguishable from the combatants, the self-defense rule is an important
characteristic of all UN peacekeeping missions.
While the practices discussed above might aid the functioning of an
independently-organized peacekeeping mission, their adoption might
pose a new series of problems. Superpowers or states with considerable
international influence will find it difficult to refrain from taking part in
non-UN peacekeeping efforts, especially when the UN has failed to act in
a crisis situation. States with a direct stake in a given crisis might also be
tempted to use the peacekeeping label to justify intervention. Further,
states participating in non-UN missions might be unwilling to relinquish
control over their own troops to a foreign commander. Similar attitudes
might prevent participating troops from observing the self-defense rule,
particularly when domestic public opinion demands reprisal for attacks
on a national peacekeeping contingent. In short, although the technical
rules for UN peacekeeping missions offer enhanced credibility to UN
forces, non-UN peacekeepers may be either unable or unwilling to adopt
such rules.
II. The Failure of the MNF in Lebanon to Establish its Legitimacy
While adherence to legal norms of behavior may not guarantee inter-
national approval, the observation of such norms constitutes an impor-
tant means of influencing state behavior.81 The failure of the MNF in
Lebanon to observe peacekeeping norms established by the UN contrib-
uted to the perception that the force was an interested party, and not an
impartial peacekeeper in the complex Lebanese conflict. This failure
considerably reduced the ability of the MNF to perform a real
peacekeeping function. This section will review the characteristics of the
MNF which contributed to its loss of international credibility.
A. Deployment of the MNF in Lebanon
The MNF was originally created to respond to two crises, one in the
Summer and one in the Fall of 1982. In each of these emergencies, vio-
lence between warring factions in Lebanon stirred international concern
but failed to evoke a satisfactory UN response. While, as will be seen
below, the United States helped to prevent effective UN action,82 the in-
81. See, e.g., M. KAPLAN & N. KATZENBACH, THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 341-54 (1961); L. HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 39-98 (1968); Gottlieb,
The Nature of International Law: Toward a Second Concept of Law, in 4 THE FUTURE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 331-83 (C. Black & R. Falk eds. 1972).
82. See infra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
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dependent peacekeeping efforts headed by the United States in both the
summer and fall of 1982 met with initial international approval.
Since its independence, Lebanon has endured recurring strife between
its Sunni and Shiite Muslim, Druze, Maronite Christian and Greek Or-
thodox factions, with the most serious national crises occurring in the
revolt of 1958 and the civil war of 1975-76.83 Since at least 1968, Leba-
non's internal unrest has been intertwined with regional politics, with
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) forces attacking Israel from the
south of Lebanon, 84 Israel responding with raids on Lebanese soil,85 and
Syria and other countries intervening in Lebanon for various purposes. 86
In March 1978, Israeli forces swept sixty miles into Lebanese territory in
an effort to force the PLO from its strongholds.8 7 Israel eventually relin-
quished all but a "six-mile belt" of this area to the United Nations In-
terim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), a peacekeeping force created by the
Security Council to oversee and patrol the Israeli withdrawal from Leba-
nese territory.8 8 Despite the presence of UNIFIL, the potential for vio-
lence was undiminished.89 In June 1982, the Israelis again undertook a
83. See generally E. KOURY, THE CRISIS IN THE LEBANESE SYSTEM: CONFESSIONALISM
AND CHAOS (1976) and D. GORDON, LEBANON: THE FRAGMENTED NATION (1980). For
analysis of the 1958 crisis, see M. AGWANI, THE LEBANESE CRISIS, 1958: A DOCUMENTED
STUDY (1965). On the civil war of 1975-76, see F. SHAKER, FIRE OVER LEBANON: COUNTRY
IN CRISIS (1976). For a modem analysis of the prospects for reconciling the various Lebanese
factions, see Tueni, Lebanon: A New Republic, FOREIGN AFF. 84-99 (1983).
84. After the creation of Israel and the war of 1948, Lebanon provided an important haven
for Palestinian refugees. By 1964, the year the Arab League established the PLO, Palestinian
refugees constituted ten percent of the Lebanese population. At that time the Lebanese gov-
ernment insisted that no PLO bases be established on its territory. K. SALIBI, CROSSROADS TO
CIVIL WAR: LEBANON 1958-76, at 25 (1976). Impelled by leftist Muslim pressure internally
and by exhortations from the rest of the Arab world, Lebanon finally signed an agreement in
Cairo in November 1969, permitting the presence of PLO forces and bases on its territory and
committing the Lebanese military not to hamper future PLO raids on Israel. Id. at 42-43. See
Haddad, Lebanon in Despair, 82 CURRENT HIST. 16 (1983).
85. The first such Israeli action occurred in December 1968. The Israelis sought to punish
Lebanon for failing to prevent PLO attacks launched against Israel from Lebanese territory.
K. SALIBI, supra note 84, at 38. Eventually, such attacks were aimed at PLO bases themselves
and increased in severity. Id. at 65, 79.
86. The 1975-76 civil war was fought, in part, because rightist Christian and centrist Mus-
lim groups sought to remove the "destabilizing" Palestinian influence from Lebanon. In April
1976, Syrian forces moved into Lebanon to help contain troops backing the PLO. By October,
the Riyadh agreement negotiated by the Arab League had established the Arab Deterrence
Forces. See supra note 7.
87. On the legal status of the Israeli action, see generally Levenfeld, Israel's Counter-
Fedayeen Tactics in Lebanon: Self-Defense and Reprisal Under Modern International Law, 21
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1982).
88. The Council called for Israel to withdraw immediately, and assigned UNIFIL to "con-
firm the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restore international peace and security, and assist the
Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area." See S. C.
Res. 425, 33 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Res. & Dec.) 5, U.N. Doc. S/INF/34 (1978).
89. See, eg., Weinberger, supra note 8, at 342-44. The contending factions included the
PLO and Major Saad Haddad, a renegade Maronite Lebanese military commander to whom
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major armed action in Lebanon. "Operation Peace for Galilee" brought
120,000 Israeli soldiers all the way to Beirut in a determined effort to
crush the PLO.90 PLO and Israeli troops then struggled for control of
West Beirut91 while 10,000 PLO and 30,000 Syrian and Arab League
troops attempted to hold their positions in northeast Lebanon. 92 By
early July, the UN had failed to take effective action93 and the PLO posi-
tion in West Beirut was rapidly deteriorating. On August 20, President
Reagan announced that a multinational force of French, Italian, and
United States troops would oversee the evacuation of 11,430 PLO and
Arab League troops and personnel from Beirut.94 The Lebanese govern-
ment, the Israeli Cabinet, and PLO leader Yasir Arafat all gave their
consent. 9
5
The first version of the MNF included 800 French soldiers, 400 Italian
soldiers, and 800 U.S. Marines stationed with the Sixth Fleet, all of
whom were to assist 3,000 members of the Lebanese Armed Forces
(LAF) both in overseeing the PLO-Arab League evacuation and in serv-
ing as a buffer between those Syrian-backed, Lebanese Muslim, and Is-
raeli forces which remained in control of various pieces of territory inside
and outside of Beirut. 96 The MNF arrived only after the arrangements
had been made for a cease-fire and for the evacuation to other countries
of Palestinian forces. 97 The MNF's stated mission was to:
a. Assure the safety of [the] departing PLO personnel;
b. Assure the safety of other persons in the Beirut area; and
c. Further the restoration of the sovereignty and authority of the Gov-
ernment of Lebanon over the Beirut area.98
The evacuations proceeded smoothly between August 21 and Septem-
the Israelis handed control of the six-mile belt area in June 1978. The activities of both contin-
ued unabated throughout this period.
90. The invasion occurred partly in retaliation for the assassination of the Israeli ambassa-
dor to the United Kingdom. It involved air, sea, and land operations, including the strafing of
PLO camps in Beirut and southern Lebanon. N.Y. Times, June 5, 1982, at Al, col. 1; N.Y.
Times, June 7, 1982, at Al, col. 4. UNIFIL's commander ordered his troops not to resist the
invading Israelis. DEP'T ST. BULL., Sept. 1982, at 19, and 21 I.L.M. 1175-76 (1982).
91. Haddad, supra note 84, at 18.
92. Id.
93. Security Council resolutions seeking an end to the Israeli invasion, and asking respect
for the July 1981 ceasefire agreement it breached, included S.C. Res. 508 (June 5, 1982) and
S.C. Res. 509 (June 6, 1982), DEP'T ST. BULL., Sept. 1982, at 14. Further UN action was
prevented, in part, by US opposition, see infra note 119.
94. DEP'T ST. BULL., Sept. 1982, at 1.
95. N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1982 at Al, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Aug. 20, 1982 at Al, col. 6.
96. DEP'T ST. BULL., Sept. 1982, at 6.
97. The PLO leadership and troops were to be dispatched to Jordan, Iraq, Tunisia, Syria,
North and South Yemen, and a number of other countries, Id. at 5-7.
98. DEP'T ST. BULL., Sept. 1982, at 2. The goals of the mission were agreed upon jointly
by the Lebanese government and the participating states.
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ber 5.99 By September 2, an estimated 15,000 PLO and related troops
had left the country, mostly by sea. 100 The U.S. forces left on September
11.101 Overall, the first MNF operation had been a short-term, interna-
tionally-accepted peacekeeping effort with a limited mandate. As such, it
had been a success.
The second MNF mission also began as a short-term operation, in re-
sponse to the crisis prompted by massacres of civilians in West Beirut
refugee camps during mid-September 1982. Israeli forces had entered
West Beirut with the stated goal of keeping order after the assassination
of Lebanese President-elect Bashir Gemayel on September 14.102 Be-
tween September 16 and 19, several hundred Palestinian civilians living
in the refugee camps were killed by Lebanese Christian Phalangists, ap-
parently to avenge the death of Gemayel. 10 3 The massacre stirred the
United Nations to action. Security Council Resolution 520 denounced
the Israeli "incursions" into West Beirut, 1°4 and Resolution 521 author-
ized the deployment of 40 new UN observers to Beirut. 0 5 The Council
also requested the Secretary-General to initiate discussions with the Leb-
anese government about "the possible deployment of United Nations
forces, to assist the Lebanese government in ensuring full protection for
the civilian population in and around Beirut."' 0 6 By September 20, the
Secretary-General had held discussions with UNIFIL Commander Gen-
eral Callaghan about possible deployment of 2,000 UNIFIL troops to
protect Beirut civilians.'07
By this time, however, events had already overtaken the UN and the
Secretary-General. The PLO had called for "military forces, or United
Nations military forces, or agreed multinational forces" to be immedi-
ately deployed to West Beirut. 08 The Italian government had asked the
U.S. and France to join in sending an international force back to Beirut
on September 20, and the French proclaimed their willingness to send
troops in connection with a UN effort or "otherwise," as necessary. 109
That same day, the Lebanese Cabinet voted to ask that the MNF be re-
99. See generally N.Y. Times, Aug. 25, 1982, at Al, col. 6; N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1982 at
Al, col. 5.
100. N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1982, at Al, col. 5.
101. N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1982, at A5, col. 1.
102. See generally N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1982, § 1 at 1, col. 4.
103. N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1982, at Al, col. 6.
104. S.C. Res. 520, 21 I.L.M. 1168, 1168-69 (1982).
10. S.C. Res. 521, 21 I.L.M. 1169, 1169-70 (1982).
106. Id.
107. Report of the Secretary-General in Pursuance of Security Council Resolution 521, 21
I.L.M. 1185, 1186-87 (1982).
108. Id. at 1187.
109. N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1982, at A4, col. 1.
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constituted and brought back to patrol Beirut," 0 and President Reagan
announced that the U.S., France, and Italy would accept the invita-
tion."' UN officials said they approved of the MNF's return, though
they lamented the UN's failure to play a more prominent role in peace
efforts. 112
Between September 24 and 27, 2,280 French and Italian troops were
deployed in East and West Beirut, and began performing mine clearing,
patrol, and humanitarian activities.1 3 They entered the Sabra and Sha-
tila refugee camps on September 27.114 On the 29th, 800 U.S. Marines
landed and took control of the Beirut International Airport and the sur-
rounding area, as Israeli forces withdrew from these sections. 1 5 The Is-
raelis had earlier left West Beirut, although their forces remained at key
points around the city, and continued to control half of Lebanon.11 6
The stated mandate of the second MNF was a limited one:
to provide an interposition force at agreed locations and thereby provide
the multinational presence requested by the Lebanese Government to assist
it and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in the Beirut area. This presence
will facilitate the restoration of Lebanese Government sovereignty and au-
thority over the Beirut area, and thereby further efforts of [the Lebanese]
Government to assure the safety of persons in the area and bring to an end
the violence which has tragically recurred. The MNF may undertake other
functions only by mutual agreement.117
In other words, the MNF was to serve as a temporary buffer between
Israeli forces and Lebanese Muslim forces, helping the LAF to regain
control of the Beirut area which all hostile troops had by this time evacu-
ated. This mandate-somewhat broader than that of the first MNF,
which had called only for evacuation supervision-was to continue for a
"limited" but unspecified duration.118
B. Changing Perceptions of the Role of the MNF
On its face, the MNF was a response to humanitarian concerns about
the safety of civilians in Beirut, undertaken in light of UN failure to act
110. N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1982, at Al, col. 5.
111. See Statement by President Reagan, DEP'T ST. BULL., Nov. 1982, at 49.
112. N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1982, at A16, col. 6.
113. 21 I.L.M. 1190 (1982).
114. N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1982, at Al, col. 6.
115. N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1982, at Al, col. 6. The total MNF contingent later grew to
over 5000 troops, including 100 British soldiers. For a map of their various positions in the
Beirut area, see The Economist, Oct. 29, 1983, at 25.
116. N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 1982, at A4, col. 4.
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quickly to secure that safety. However, important political factors were
also involved in the decision of the Western powers, particularly the
United States, to establish the MNF. Among these factors was U.S. con-
cern that UN involvement could change the balance of power in Leba-
non, or introduce new parties into the conflict. In the July-August crisis,
U.S. representatives had vetoed Security Council resolutions which they
felt were "not sufficiently balanced," generally because the resolutions
did not require a complete PLO withdrawal from Beirut and from Leba-
non.1 19 The United States may have resisted deployment of UNIFIL in
Beirut because of Israeli claims that the UN force had been co-opted by
pro-Arab groups, compromising its neutrality. 120 Moreover, U.S. policy-
makers may have feared that expanded UN efforts would allow the So-
viet Union to become more directly involved in the Mideast: the Soviets
had made clear their preference that the Lebanese problem be dealt with
in international forums. 21 To avoid these and other problems, the
United States may have found it convenient to preempt UN intervention
altogether by launching an independent peacekeeping mission. This
would explain the hasty U.S. assent to the reestablishment of the MNF
before the Secretary-General and the Security Council could complete
preparations for a UN force.' 22
The United States was also anxious to bolster the conservative Chris-
tian government of Amin Gemayel, who had become president after his
119. On June 8, the U.S. vetoed a Council draft resolution which condemned Israeli non-
compliance with UN requests for its withdrawal and which contained veiled threats of sanc-
tions for continued non-compliance. Ambassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick explained that the U.S.
wanted a more balanced UN resolution. See DEP'T ST. BULL., Sept. 1982, at 14-15. The U.S.
also vetoed a June 25 draft resolution that called for the withdrawal of Israeli forces to a
distance of 10 kilometers from the city periphery, withdrawal of Palestinian forces to existing
camps outside Beirut, and stationing of UN military observers to supervise the disengagement,
with Lebanese agreement; the draft resolution also requested a study by the Secretary-General
of any request by the Lebanese government for installation of a UN force which could "take
up positions besides [sic] the Lebanese interposition forces" or for "the use of the forces avail-
able to that region." DEP'T ST. BULL., Sept. 1982, at 16-17.
120. Some UN agencies in the Middle East allegedly aided the PLO. In particular, Israeli
Army officials discovered significant arms caches in refugee camps near Sidon which were run
by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency. N.Y. Times, June 30, 1982, at A10, col. 3.
Some observers rejected Israeli claims against UNIFIL as exaggerated. See Statement of In-
ternational Lawyers, 11 J. PALESTINE STUD. 336 (1982).
121. The Soviets also stressed that they preferred a UN force rather than a force in which
the United States and other Western states played a role. N.Y. Times, July 9, 1982, at Al, col,
4; N.Y. Times, July 21, 1982, at A9, col. 1. For analysis of Soviet policies in Lebanon gener-
ally, see Golan, The Soviet Union and the Israeli Action in Lebanon, 59 INT'L AFr. 7 (1982-83).
122. Admittedly, the US may have seriously considered, and at one point favored, installa-
tion of a UN force. See, eg., N.Y. Times, June 9, 1982, at A18, col. 1 (statement by Secretary
of State Alexander Haig that an eventual settlement should include more UN troops and fewer
Syrian troops in Lebanon).
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brother's assassination.123 Israel had given the right-wing Lebanese par-
ties $100 million in aid between 1977 and 1982.124 The U.S. commitment
to the Gemayel Administration was made clear in the months following
MNF deployment. 125 Once the MNF had been deployed, the U.S. kept
it in Lebanon while trying to negotiate a withdrawal of Syrian, Israeli,
and other foreign forces1 26 because, as one analyst put it, "the with-
drawal of the Marines might be seen as a sign of lack of confidence in
Mr. Gemayel, which might lead to his overthrow." 127 In general, the
continued U.S. presence allowed the United States a pivotal role in at-
tempting both to shape a final settlement of the Lebanese conflict, and to
guarantee some minimal protection of Israeli interests.
Increasing U.S. military and political cooperation with the Gemayel
government may have proved detrimental to the avowed "peacekeeping"
mission of the MNF,128 although U.S. officials continued to insist that
the MNF was in fact playing a neutral peacekeeping role in Lebanon. 129
Conflicting explanations of MNF's mission'did not help matters. 130 As
123. For analysis of U.S. and Israeli interests in Lebanon, see Tucker, Lebanon: The Case
for the War, Commentary, Oct. 1982, at 19.
124. Haddad, supra note 84, at 17.
125. See, eg., statements by Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth W. Dam suggesting that
the US should "restore" Lebanese sovereignty, strengthen the Lebanese armed forces, and aid
in national reconciliation and economic reconstruction. DEP'T ST. BULL., Jan. 1983, at 73-75.
126. On US efforts to negotiate a settlement, see, e.g., Gwertzman, US Hopes Sharon's
Departure May Ease Lebanon Withdrawal, N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1983, at E2, col. 1; N.Y.
Times, Feb. 15, 1983, at A9, col. 1; N.Y. Times, April 24, 1983, at 1, col. 6.
127. Gwertzman, Marines' Role in Beirut Has Drastically Shifted, N.Y. Times, Oct. 25,
1983, at A12, col. 1.
128. See, eg., Ignatius, Lebanon Army Victory, With US Help, Marked Turning Point for
Both Nations, Wall St. J., Oct. 7, 1983, at 37, col. 2 (describing US Navy bombings of Syrian-
backed forces advancing on Lebanese Army positions); Report: Marines'Role Muddled, supra
note 95 (explaining that the US Army had begun to train and to supply weapons to Lebanese
Army troops); N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1983, at 4, col. 1 (suggesting that at first "the Gemayel
Government was so weak, had such a tenuous hold on the country and had so little self-
confidence that it felt desperately in need of Washington's backing"); Gwertzman, US and
Lebanese Move to Bolster Relations, N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1983, at 4, col. 3 (describing the
formation of new "joint economic and military committees" to aid the unification of Lebanon,
as well as to support the "morale of the Lebanese Government"). In short, the Lebanese
government depended on the participation of the MNF to retain its sovereignty. This depen-
dence hardly comported with U.S. participation in a supposedly neutral peacekeeping force.
Indeed, the Lebanese encouraged U.S. forces to become more closely committed to LAF mili-
tary efforts. See, e.g., Lebanon Is Asking New Marine Role; US Reaction Cool, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 6, 1984, at Al, col. 6 (Gemayel government asks Marine deployment to south coast to
help LAF extend authority).
129. See, e.g., Statement by President Reagan that the U.S. forces in Lebanon are "part of
a multinational peace-keeping force seeking withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon and
from the Beirut area while a new Lebanese government undertakes to restore sovereignty
throughout that country." N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1983, at A10, col. 1.
130. Cf e.g., supra note 129, with statements that the Marine role in Lebanon is "vital to
world peace" and "central to our credibility on a global scale," which seem to indicate two
widely divergent objectives, N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1983, at Al, col. 6; see also Review of State-
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the peacekeeping role of the MNF appeared to be transformed more and
more into that of a support force for the Gemayel government,131 opposi-
tion to the MNF increased. At first, the force found itself "accidentally"
caught in crossfires from gun and rocket battles outside Beirut. 132 It
even experienced near-skirmishes over territory with Israeli forces. 133
Within its first year and a half of deployment, the MNF was the object of
attacks by snipers, direct rocket fire, and a truck bombing in October
1983 which killed 241 Marines.134 The U.S. embassy in Beirut was
bombed in April 1983.135 While the sources of the attacks against the
MNF could not always be determined with accuracy, some appeared to
come from Syrian-backed and leftist Muslim troops.136 Eventually, the
U.S. and France undertook reprisals against military forces which had
attacked their MNF contingents, turning the relationship between the
MNF and the surrounding armed forces into virtual war.137 Diplomatic
efforts to achieve a withdrawal of all foreign forces and supervision of
Lebanese territory by the LAF proceeded, 138 and Western governments
ments since September 1982, N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1983, at A12, col. 1 and Administration
suggestions that the Marines were now in Lebanon only to provide a "breathing spell" until
the Lebanese government could reorganize itself and its military. N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1984, at
A4, col. 1.
131. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1983, at A12, col. 3.
132. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, May 8, 1983, at A10, col. 5 (report of U.S. Navy ship almost
hit by rockets fired between Druze and Christian militias).
133. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1983, at 1, col. 1, and Feb. 17, 1983, at 15, col 1. See
also Boston Globe, Mar. 19, 1983, at 3, col. 5.
134. See, e.g., Boston Globe, Mar. 23, at 13, col. 2 (Italian soldier is first MNF member
killed in terrorist attack); N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1983, at All, col. 1. (grenade attack injures
US and Italian soldiers); N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1983, at A14, col. 1 (three Marines wounded in
artillery duels between LAF and Druze); Beirut Death Toll at 146 Americans; French Casual-
ties Rise in Bombings, N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1983, at 1, cols. 1, 6 (account of truck bombing of
U.S. and French compounds).
135. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1983, at 1, col. 6.
136. See generally Middleton, The Foe in Lebanon: Divided but Strong, N.Y. Times, Dec.
11, 1983, at 16, col. 1.
137. See, e.g., US Marines Join in Beirut Fighting, Int'l Herald Tribune, Aug. 29, 1983
(first time U.S. contingent returned fire); US Navy Enters Lebanon Fighting Shelling Hill Site,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1983, at 1, col. 6 (in response to Druze shelling of Marine airport posi-
tions); 8 French Jets Hit Militia Positions in Lebanon Clash, N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1983, at 1,
col. 6; U.S. Bombers Hit Lebanon, Syrians Down 2; N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1983, at 1, col. 6 (U.S.
air strikes against Syrian-backed targets); New Jersey's Guns Shell Syrian Sites in Lebanese
War, N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1983, at 1, col. 6.
138. A May 17, 1983 Israeli-Lebanese agreement, under which Israel would gradually
withdraw as Lebanese Army troops moved in to guarantee the security of southern Lebanon,
met with resistance from the various Lebanese factions present at an inconclusive "national
reconciliation" conference in Geneva. See generally Trounson, Achievements and Pitfalls at
the Lebanon Conference, Boston Globe, Nov. 6, 1983, at 26, col. 1. By early January, other
peace efforts had made some progress. See Treaster, Lebanon Disengagement Plan Accepted,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1984, at A6, col. 1.
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urged the Gemayel regime to broaden its political base. 139 However,
these latter events did little to remove now-established perceptions of the
MNF as a partisan intervention force. 14°
C. Legal Difficulties and Loss of Credibility
The Reagan Administration was careful to cite the Lebanese govern-
ment's invitation as the legal basis for the entry and deployment of the
MNF.141 However, the correspondence surrounding the creation of the
MNF142 and the events of the summer and fall of 1982 suggest that the
Gemayel government no longer possessed effective control of Lebanese
soil, and was thus incapable of consenting to the presence of foreign
troops in Lebanon. 143 Further, even if the Lebanese invitation was valid,
the MNF did not meet the UN standard of all-party consent. 144 If the
Israelis consented to the presence of the MNF, it was clear that the vari-
ous Muslim and Syrian-backed factions active in northern Lebanon did
not. At a minimum, consultation with these factions prior to MNF de-
ployment might have provided an opportunity to reassure them of the
MNF's non-partisan character. Had these parties been consulted, not
only might they have given their consent to MNF deployment, but the
Soviet Union and other critics would have found it more difficult to de-
139. See Gwertzman, US Bids Gemayel Broaden His Base to Unify Lebanon, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 2, 1983, at Al, col. 6.
140. "The multinational force, for all its physical power, has a narrow political base that,
in times of crisis, can cause its intentions to be, perhaps deliberaiely, misperceived by parties to
the conflict." Urquhart, On UN Peacekeeping, N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1983, at A19, col. 1.
141. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
142. A September 25, 1982 letter from Lebanese Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of
Foreign Affairs Fouad Boutros explained that the MNF would "facilitate the restoration of
Lebanese Government sovereignty and authority over the Beirut area." The letter professed
"the determination of the Government of Lebanon to restore its sovereignty and authority
over the Beirut area and thereby to assure the safety of persons in the area. . ." DEP'T ST.
BULL., Nov. 1982, at 50. These statements implicitly admit that the Lebanese "government"
had lost control of segments of Lebanese territory, raising questions about the validity of its
authority in those areas. See supra notes 26-63 and accompanying text.
143. The events of August-September 1982 alone-including the massacres in Beirut refu-
gee camps, the free movement of armed bands, and Israel's refusal to withdraw from Lebanese
territory-suggest that the Gemayel regime did not have effective control over Lebanon.
Israel and Major Haddad occupied fully half of Lebanon, Syrian-backed forces controlled the
Bekaa Valley and parts of northeast Lebanon, and a variety of armed forces owing no alle-
giance to the Gemayel government controlled sections of the capital city. See supra notes 82-
118 and accompanying text. See also The Economist, Oct. 23, 1982, at 33. By February 1984,
widespread dissatisfaction with the Gemayel government had sparked calls for the President's
resignation by Druze and other leaders. Shiite Muslims urged their representatives to leave the
cabinet, and encouraged Muslim LAF soldiers not to fight against rebel forces. See N.Y.
Times, Feb. 5, 1984, at Al, col. 6. The Prime Minister and nine-member Cabinet of the
Gemayel government resigned on February 6. N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1984, at Al, col. 6.
144. See supra notes 26-63 and accompanying text.
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ride the partisan nature of the force.145
Such criticism was partly borne out by the overt support of the MNF
for the Gemayel government, and by its lack of interest in the technical
peacekeeping rules developed by UN practice. 146 Of the four Western
states comprising the MNF, all were NATO members and/or permanent
members of the Security Council; one was a superpower, and three had
intervened militarily in the Middle East at some time during the previous
thirty years. 147 In short, the MNF participants did not represent a
broadly-based, politically diverse and disinterested group of countries
whose presence was likely to inspire inter-national confidence or sup-
port. 148 Instead, the MNF attracted the vehement opposition of Middle
Eastern states and other parties which were in a position to undermine its
peacekeeping efforts. 149 In part because of the identity of its participants,
the MNF became a pawn in the struggle for control of the Middle East.
Several other factors combined to make the position of the MNF un-
tenable: the vulnerability of the MNF participants to internal political
pressure, the lack of an integrated command structure, and the failure to
adopt a uniform and consistent self-defense policy. Safety concerns and
domestic opposition forced the French and Italian governments to re-
duce or redeploy their MNF contingents. 150 In the United States, similar
145. The Soviets termed the MNF presence "interference" in Lebanon, claiming it had far
less legitimacy than had Syrian and PLO forces brought in under the Arab League mandate
for ADF. See, eg., Soviet Intensifies Its Criticism of US and Allied Forces in Lebanon, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 25, 1983, at A13, col. 1. The Soviets also called the MNF a US "invasion and
occupation force," Medvedko, Twenty-Five Years Later, New Times, Oct. 1983, at 10-11.
They also said MNF had entered Lebanon on a "pretext" to install a pro-Israeli dictatorship,
Nikolayev, "Quiet Americans" on Arab Soil, New Times, Sept. 1983, at 8-9.
146. See supra notes 64-80 and accompanying text.
147. The United Kingdom and France had intervened in the Suez crisis of 1956. See gen-
erally R. BOWIE, SuEz 1956 (1974). The U.S. had, of course, intervened in the 1958 Lebanese
crisis. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
148. Troops from smaller states have played a vital and successful role in past UN
peacekeeping missions. See generally D. WAINHOUSE, supra note 4, at ch. 16. In fairness to
the MNF states, it should be noted that 15 nations apparently refused to join the MNF be-
tween August 1982 and December 1983. See Boston Globe, Dec. 23, 1983, at 8, col. 1.
149. For example, Iranian hatred of the U.S. seems to have encouraged Iranian groups to
play a role in the October 1983 truck bombing of U.S. and French compounds. See Brinkley,
Mideast Bombers: Hard to Pin Down, N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1983, at A6, col. 4. Syria has long
opposed US interests in the Middle East, while the Reagan administration has sometimes
stressed superpower geopolitics as a factor leading to U.S. participation in the MNF. See, e.g.,
Reagan: Syria gets new Soviet arms, Boston Globe, Oct. 9, 1983, at 15, col. 3.
150. The October 1983 bombing of MNF troop compounds, see supra note 134 and ac-
companying text, initially had no effect on the resolve of the four MNF participants to remain
in Lebanon. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1983, at Al, col. 5. However, domestic pressures in each
participating state gradually caused some divergence in positions.
The French government strongly favored participation in the MNF, see e.g., Carnage in
Beirut Only Stiffens the Will of the French to Stay, N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1983, at A24, col. 1,
apparently with solid public backing. See Le Monde, Nov. 19, 1983, at 4 (all parties except
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worries, 51 together with a controversy over presidential authority to de-
ploy troops in Lebanon, 152 ultimately brought about the U.S. pullout in
February 1984.153 The possibility that domestic political pressures might
precipitate the withdrawal of troops at any moment could hardly have
enhanced the credibility of the force as a stabilizing influence. Moreover,
it offered those anxious to bring about withdrawal an incentive to step up
attacks on the MNF.
The lack of a single, unified command structure may have contributed
to inconsistent behavior by the four MNF contingents, which further un-
dermined their credibility as peacekeepers. In October 1982, a group of
French soldiers went on patrol with LAF troops and helped disarm left-
ist and Muslim bands.154 Without an integrated command, such inci-
dents were bound to occur. One veteran of UN peacekeeping efforts has
called the MNF's decentralized command a "hazard" which could do
Communists support Mitterrand policy in Lebanon and retaliation against truck bombers).
However, criticism of the government policy eventually developed. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 22,
1983, at A9, col. 1. By the end of 1983, France had decided to adopt new measures to protect
its contingent, see Le Monde, Dec. 15, 1983, at 1, col. 2; Miami Herald, Jan. 3, 1984, at 1, col.
6.
The Italian government apparently faced a more intense public debate over the status and
purpose of its national contingent in MNF, including strong criticism from some of its political
opponents. See Le Monde, Dec. 9, 1983, at 3. It eventually agreed to withdraw half of its
2200 troops from Lebanon, although as part of a "slow, low-profile exodus." Wall St. J., Dec.
16, 1983, at 34, col. 4.
The British government held to its firm stance in favor of the small national force which
served with MNF. See Mm Thatcher Says Britain Will Keep Troops in Beirut, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 7, 1983, at A18, col. 5. Strong objections from the Labour Party and others in the House
of Commons did not sway British resolve. See Erlanger, The Pressure on Thatcher to With-
draw from Lebanon. Boston Globe, Jan. 5, 1984, at 7, col. 1.
151. In the U.S., calls for withdrawal of Marines from Lebanon were renewed, see Critics
in Congress Declare Reagan Is Heading for War, N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1983, at A20, col. 5,
particularly in response to heightened US retaliation against Syrian attacks. See supra note
137.
152. The April 1983 bombing of the American embassy in Beirut prompted Congressional
moves to limit presidential powers to deploy US troops in Lebanon. See Gwertzman, Marines
in Lebanon. Congress is Becoming Wary, N.Y. Times, April 20, 1983, at AS, col. 3. Eventu-
ally, both houses of Congress passed legislation granting permission under the War Powers
Resolution for the Marines to remain in Lebanon up to 18 months. President Reagan claimed
authority to deploy troops even without such permission. See War Powers Resolution, Pub. L.
No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-48). For Congressional ap-
proval, see Pub.L. No. 98-119, 1983 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws (97 Stat.). See generally
Gelb, Lebanon Peacekeeping Sets Stage for War Powers Debate, N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1983, at
El, col. I; Reagan, Congress Agree to Keep Marines In Lebanon As Fighting Clouds Peace Bid,
Wall St. J., Sept 21, 1983, at 3, col. 2; Roberts, Congress Adopts Measure Allowing Marines in
Beirut, N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1983, at Al, col. 6. Political controversy over the status of the
Marines in Lebanon did not die with passage of War Powers authorization. See supra note 151
and accompanying text.
153. Continued heavy fighting in the Beirut area forced the U.S., Italian, and British cont-
ingents to undertake phased withdrawal to ships offshore. See N.Y.Times, Feb. 8, 1984, at Al,
col. 6.
154. See Weinberger, supra note 8, at 365.
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little to enhance peacekeeping missions.155
The failure of the MNF peacekeepers to define and observe a consis-
tent policy on questions of self-defense further jeopardized the success of
the mission. Initially, the force appeared ready to adhere strictly to self-
defense rules similar to those of the UN, with one U.S. Marine com-
mander stating that his men would go on patrol without bullets in their
rifles.1 56 By the end of 1983, however, the MNF had begun to work
closely with the Lebanese Army, and to retaliate against attacks on its
forces by air and sea-launched bomb or rocket responses.157 It had also
established a clear policy of returning ground fire in attempts to remove
sniper and other opposition.1 58 While such responses may be under-
standable from a military point of view, they did little to reinforce the
avowed peacekeeping role of the MNF, or to lessen perceptions of parties
to the conflict that the MNF was a partisan intervention force allied with
the Gemayel government. The departure from the self-defense rule may
have been unavoidable, given the incomprehension and frustration of on-
lookers in the participating countries.1 59 Indeed, the shifting role and
increased military action of the MNF after September 1982 may perhaps
be best explained as a response to demands by the home constituencies of
participating states for retaliation against the attackers of the MNF.1 60
Of course, the MNF stood under no obligation to follow UN proce-
dures. However, its avowed mission was to keep the peace, and the most
effective technical means-as well as legal and other bases of support -
should have been marshalled behind it. As indicated above, failure to
learn from UN precedents may have been a costly error.
III. Improving the Effectiveness of Non-UN Peacekeeping Missions
If non-UN forces are to serve a credible, constructive role in the reso-
lution of future international conflicts, such forces will have to build in-
ternational support for their activities and to distinguish themselves
clearly from ordinary military forces. It is important to develop tech-
155. Urquhart, supra note 140.
156. N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1982, at A12, col. 2 (statement by Col. James Mead).
157. See supra notes 82-118 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
159. Domestic critics complained that the Marines were "sitting ducks," or lampooned the
ironies of their mission. See, eg., Buchwald, Peacekeepers can't get angry, Boston Globe, Sept.
22, 1983, at 31, col. 2. The Marines themselves professed that "it feels a little odd" to be
"holed up in a defensive position." Marines View of Beirut Mission: To 'Hunker Down and
Bunker In' N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1983, at Al, col. 5
160. In Fall 1983, President Reagan assurred listeners that "The Marines will always de-
fend themselves, and we will provide that defense." N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1983, at A12, col. 5
(statement of Oct. 19, 1983).
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niques for achieving these objectives before the problems experienced by
the MNF in Lebanon repeat themselves. Some of the suggestions dis-
cussed in this section include a role for the UN in "collective legitimiza-
tion" of non-UN peacekeeping efforts (despite the difficulties which this
concept involves), while others attempt to establish other sources of legit-
imacy for non-UN missions.
A. Association of Independent Peacekeeping Missions with the UN
Even when, as in the Lebanon crisis, the Security Council proves un-
able to establish its own peacekeeping force, there are ways in which the
UN might play a constructive role in legitimizing the efforts of non-UN
peacekeepers. For instance, the UN might create regular channels
through which it could monitor non-UN missions. Under such a plan,
observers from such agencies as the United Nations Truce Supervisory
Organization (UNTSO)1 61 would monitor the operation of peacekeeping
forces, reporting back to the Secretary-General or the General Assembly
at regular intervals. This proposal would enhance the credibility of the
peacekeepers, by reassuring critics of their neutrality and impartial con-
duct. UNTSO actually carried on this kind of monitoring activity for a
brief period at the beginning of the MNF deployment in Lebanon.1 62
A more radical strategy would involve the establishment of a perma-
nent, independent "international police force," to be funded and con-
trolled by the UN. The purpose of such an entity would be to isolate the
peacekeepers from short-term "political pressures," so that they could
serve as a genuinely neutral buffer in crisis situations.1 63 Both this and
the monitoring proposal discussed above pose major practical difficulties,
because both the judgment of UN observers and the actions of interna-
tional police would be subject to the factional politics of the UN itself.
Thus, UN involvement might only exacerbate the problem it is intended
to solve. At best, UN assistance for private peacekeeping efforts can be
helpful only when there already exists a high degree of international
consensus.
161. For a general description of UNTSO and its activities, see D. WAINHOUSE, supra
note 1, at 256-76.
162. See, e.g., 21 I.L.M. 1185-87 (1982) (describing arrival and activities of UNTS0 mem-
bers prior to MNF arrival) and id. at 1189-90 (UN observers report to Secretary-General on
developments in Beirut after MNF deployment began).
163. See discussion of the Christian Herter proposal for disarmament and world police
forces to enforce it, International Forces Today and Tomorrow, in INTERNATIONAL MILITARY
FORCES supra note 45 at 11-23. See also Schelling, Strategy: A World Force in Operation, id.
at 212-35.
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B. Establishment of Legal and Technical Standards for International
Peacekeeping Activities
Where the UN cannot play a direct or indirect role in keeping the
peace, the legal and technical norms which have evolved as a result of
past UN efforts provide a code of conduct which potential peacekeepers
might do well to follow. Indeed, if these norms could be defined with
sufficient detail and specificity, they might form the basis for a conven-
tion under which the legitimacy of non-UN peacekeeping missions could
be assessed. Among the central requirements of such a convention
would be that peacekeeping missions: (1) be established under the appro-
priate legal procedures of participating countries; (2) be deployed only
with the consent of all major parties to the conflict; (3) consist of forces
from a minimum number of countries of specified geographical distribu-
tion, and whose participation would comprise a minimum percentage of
the total force; (4) be commanded by a centralized administration with
ultimate authority over all national contingents, and to whom all parties
not connected with the mission could address complaints or communica-
tions; and (5) be conducted under recognized rules of self-defense prohib-
iting the performance of any other military functions, and prohibiting
military cooperation or coordination with any armed forces which are
parties to the conflict.
The requirement that missions be established pursuant to the appropri-
ate legal procedures of participating countries would shield such missions
from the kind of debilitating and destabilizing domestic debate which
characterized United States involvement in the MNF. While the process
of obtaining parliamentary or congressional approval might be time-con-
suming, it would ultimately insure internal political consensus on the va-
lidity of the mission.
The requirement of major-party consent also has its drawbacks, and
might rule out many potential peace efforts. Nonetheless, without such
consent, peacekeeping efforts are futile, however well-intentioned. This
requirement also poses the problem of defining "major party." One pos-
sible definition would include any group undertaking the obligations of a
party to Protocol I (1977) of the Geneva Conventions of August 12,
1949,164 or otherwise meriting combatant status and treatment under Ar-
164. In other words, an "authority representing a people" making a unilateral declaration
to respect the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and subsequent protocols, as provided by Article
96(3) of Protocol I (1977). See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, (Protocol I)
1977, reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF THE LAWS OF WAR 389 (A. Roberts & R. Guelff eds.
1982). Any such "authority" would be an identifiable unit by virtue of its having made a
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ticle 43 of the Conventions. 165 In many situations, however, this defini-
tion would be too restrictive, excluding armed groups not covered by the
Conventions.166
The third requirement would seek to achieve a balanced composition
for peacekeeping missions by mandating the inclusion of small, non-
aligned states. Minimum percentages from these states would avoid
domination of the mission by a key state or states. 167
Centralized authority over multinational missions is important for
both internal cohesion and external communication. Detailed guidelines
could be developed to govern the creation of a unified command, the
relationship of the participating contingents to the command and to each
other, and the rules under which individual contingents would be permit-
ted to withdraw from participation.
The requirement restricting the activities of peacekeeping forces to
self-defense obviously requires the adequate definition of that elusive con-
cept. Existing UN practice provides at least a partial guide.168 Among
the additional requirements which might apply in the non-UN context
are that peacekeeping forces not be permitted to displace armed forces
from the territory which they occupy, that they be permitted to respond
to armed attacks only with the force required to repel them, and that
they be permitted to use only those tactical weapons deemed appropriate
to their role.
Agreement upon such norms as these will not be a panacea for dis-
putes over the legitimacy of non-UN peacekeeping operations. What
such agreement will provide is a basic legal and political framework for
minimizing such disputes. Adoption of this framework might at least
encourage future non-UN missions to consider modes of legal and tech-
nical conduct likely to win the approval of the international community.
declaration. The legal status of such an "authority" would, of course, depend on interpreta-
tions of Article 1(4) of the Protocol.
165. In short, all "armed forces of a Party to a conflict," which means "all organized
armed forces, groups and units which are under a command responsible to that Party for the
conduct of its subordinates .... "Id., Art. 43, at 411. This definition would have the effect of
requiring consent for peacekeeping deployment from any party to the conflict protected by and
assuming obligations under the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Protocols thereto.
166. See generally, Rubin, Terrorism, "Grave Breaches" and the 1977 Geneva Protocols, 74
PROCEEDINGS OF THE AM. SOCIETY OF INT'L L. 192-96 (1980); Rubin, Terrorism and the
Laws of War, 12 DEN. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 219 (1983); and Draper, Humanitarian Law and
International Armed Conflicts, 13 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 253 (Supp. 1983) for a discussion
of a few of the issues raised, including whether conflicts are "international" or "internal" and
which armed groups the rules ought to apply to.
167. Of course, participation by states too numerous and diverse might also hamper force
effectiveness. Maximum limits might also be imposed to meet this objection. See supra notes
66-77 and accompanying text.
168. For the rules followed by UN missions, see supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
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It might also provide an objective standard against which the actions of
controversial peacekeeping missions could be assessed.
C. Maintenance by National Governments of Special
Peacekeeping Forces
States might enhance the credibility of their independent peacekeeping
efforts and improve their effectiveness by creating special sections of their
national armed forces whose sole function would be to participate in
peacekeeping activities. This suggestion is not a novel one. In 1965, Re-
publican members of Congress endorsed the concept of a U.S. "First Bri-
gade" of specially-trained volunteers ready for service with UN
peacekeeping forces at short notice. 169
The rationale for such separate forces is that ordinary soldiers are
trained, not to keep the peace, but to fight. Peacekeepers require special
training in conciliation, negotiation, and conflict mediation. 170 The skills
needed for successful peacekeeping service may more closely resemble
those of a domestic police officer than those of a soldier. 171 Indeed, it
may be quite difficult to teach soldiers trained in an aggressive, partisan
posture to adopt the impartial attitudes crucial to peacekeeping
operations.172
Forces already experienced in peacekeeping operations,1 73 or specially
trained and separate from conventional armed forces, would likely be
well-equipped for their non-combat role. Further, they would probably
have greater credibility in the eyes of the international community. Both
their special training and their separation from ordinary military forces
might reduce the likelihood of clashes with armed parties which could
jeopardize the safety and the neutrality of the peacekeepers, and lead to a
larger conflict.
169. A. Cox, supra note 45, at 78-79. The U.S. rejected plans to pursue the idea partly
because the State Department felt its adoption would reduce national leverage with the UN.
Id at 77.
170. See Dicks, The International Soldier-A Psychiatrist's View, in INTERNATIONAL MIL-
ITARY FORCES, supra note 45, at 236-56.
171. See A. WAsycow, TOWARDS A PEACEMAKERS ACADEMY 14 (1967), and D.
WAINHOUSE, supra note 4, at 619-20.
172. M. HARBOiTLE, THE IMPARTIAL SOLDIER 45-48 (1970). Indeed, the disparity be-
tween the incongruity of a peacekeeping role and the training accorded the Marines sent to
Lebanon has been cited as a source of their frustration. Friedman, American's Failure in Leba-
non, N.Y. Times (Magazine), April 8, 1984 § 6, p. 32 at 65.
173. Experience in past UN missions would be an ideal qualification for service in future
peacekeeping operations, according to one analyst. See Harbottle, The October Middle East
War: Lessons for UN Peacekeeping, 50 INT'L AFF. 544, 549 (1974).
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Conclusion
Successful peacekeeping requires careful preparation, a broadly-based
consensus within the international community, and scrupulously well-
defined objectives and operating procedures. As nearly thirty years of
UN peacekeeping experience has demonstrated, the observance of estab-
lished legal and technical norms can enhance the effectiveness of
peacekeeping forces, and contribute substantially to the international
credibility which they require. By failing to respect these norms, the
MNF in Lebanon did little to enhance its image as a disinterested keeper
of the peace. Further missions organized outside UN auspices must not
repeat the same mistake.
If the peacekeeping concept developed by Pearson and Hammarskjold
is to remain of service to humanity, agreement must be reached on the
composition and behavior appropriate to the peacekeeper's role. Only
when this role is accepted and understood by the major parties to a con-
flict, the peacekeepers' domestic constituencies, and the international
community, can a peacekeeping mission confidently interpose itself as a
buffer between warring parties.
